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Draft: June 14, 2005
The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste
(forthcoming, Administrative Law Stories, ed. Peter Strauss)
Gillian E. Metzger*
Tucked into Vermont’s southeast corner, the small town of Vernon might seem an
unlikely backdrop for one of the most important decisions interpreting the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).  But in 1966 the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation applied
for a permit to start building a nuclear reactor along the banks of the Connecticut River in
Vernon, and three years later applied for an operating license to run it.  Thus were set in motion
the agency proceedings that ultimately culminated, in 1978, in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council.1
What follows here is the story of Vermont Yankee.  To give a brief preview:  The Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC), in response to challenges raised against Vermont Yankee’s
operating license application, issued a rule addressing the environmental effects of the nuclear
fuel cycle for use in assessing a reactor’s environmental impact.  The rule then came before the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, increasingly becoming the nation’s
central administrative law court and subjecting agency decisionmaking to assertive review.  The
D.C. Circuit concluded the AEC had failed to “thorough[ly] ventilat[e]” the issues of long-term
storage and reprocessing of nuclear waste, and remanded the fuel cycle rule to the agency.  In
2Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court in turn reversed the D.C. Circuit, using the decision as an
occasion to clip that court’s wings and sternly rebuking it for suggesting the procedures utilized
by the agency were deficient.
Vermont Yankee is a milestone in the development of judicial review in the modern
regulatory state.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the courts were faced with burgeoning federal
regulation at a time when public confidence in agency expertise and impartiality was at low ebb. 
A debate reigned about what was the appropriate judicial response to this development.  The
main protagonists in this debate were two judges on the D.C. Circuit, Chief Judge David Bazelon
and Judge Harold Leventhal.  On many issues, the two were in accord; both accepted the need for
enhanced judicial scrutiny of agency decisionmaking and for expansive readings of the APA’s
requirements for informal rulemaking.  Where they disagreed was over whether the courts should
impose procedural requirements on rulemaking beyond those listed in the APA or required by
other statutes, agency regulations, or due process.  Bazelon advocated such judicial procedural
impositions, believing that courts were not competent to address the merits of the complex
technological issues often involved, while Leventhal contended that courts should limit
themselves to rigorous substantive scrutiny of agency decisionmaking.
Vermont Yankee stands as a rejection of Bazelon’s proceduralist approach, with the
Supreme Court ostensibly restricting judicial development of administrative procedure to the
rarest of circumstances.  The Court instructed federal judges in no uncertain terms that they
should not embellish on the informal rulemaking procedures contained in the APA and codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 553.  Yet the lower courts continued to do exactly that, avoiding a direct
confrontation with Vermont Yankee by rooting their procedural demands (however implausibly)
in the text of § 553.  In addition, even in Vermont Yankee itself, the Court affirmed the
2 See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266-73 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (Sept. 1, 2004).
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importance of careful judicial scrutiny to ensure that agencies provide an adequate record to
justify the substance of the rules they adopt.  The pressure of such substantive judicial review of
agency decisionmaking led agencies to undertake additional deviations from the APA’s minimal
procedural blueprint for informal rulemaking—in particular, dramatically expanding the record
and explanatory basis of their decisions.  
On the other hand, it would be wrong to view Vermont Yankee as simply a toothless tiger. 
The decision limited the arsenal that judges could call upon to ensure agency accountability,
arguably with poor or at least mixed results.  After Vermont Yankee, agencies had less reason to
explore new procedural formats as a means of addressing accountability concerns in-house, while
courts were encouraged to engage in close substantive review of agency decisions for which they
were often ill-equipped.  At a minimum, the need to base procedural requirements in the APA’s
text limited courts’ ability to overtly assess the policy benefits of procedural innovations or take
into account the changed landscape of federal regulation.
The one thing Vermont Yankee clearly did not do, however, was resolve the growing
debate over nuclear power and the problem of nuclear waste.  Nearly thirty years after Vermont
Yankee the nation still lacks a means for long-term storage of high-level nuclear waste. 
Moreover, as Yogi Berra famously said, it’s deja vu all over again, as a recent D.C. Circuit
decision has put on hold government efforts to develop a long-term waste repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada.2
3 This discussion of issues surrounding nuclear waste and the federal government’s
response is drawn largely from the following sources: J. Samuel Walker, Containing the Atom:
Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-71 (1992); Joel Yellin, High Technology
and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 489
(1981); Charles H. Montange, Federal Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy, 27 Nat. Resources J. 309
(1987);  American Physical Soc’y, Study Group on Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste Management,
Report to the American Physical Society, 50 Mod. Rev. Physics 1 (1978); Nuclear Energy Inst.,
373 F.3d at 1258-62.
4 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 3d, 68 Stat. 919, 922, (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2013(d)).
5 Walker, supra note 3, at 18.
4
I. Vermont Yankee at the AEC
With the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the federal government embarked on a policy of
fostering commercial uses of nuclear power.3  Prior to this point, nuclear plants in the United
States were government-owned and operated under the aegis of the AEC.  But the 1954 Act
instructed the AEC to “encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense
and security and with the health and safety of the public.”4  Even with the impetus of the 1954
Act, it was only in the 1960s that significant numbers of commercial plants began to be built.  By
the late 1960s, however, a “great bandwagon market” for commercial nuclear power was
underway, with utilities seeking permission to build new and larger nuclear power plants.5  
Perhaps given the limited number of plants then in existence, for many years the AEC did
not devote substantial attention to the question of how to deal with the wastes generated by
nuclear power.  The most noxious waste products generated by nuclear power plants are the
highly radioactive and toxic elements contained in spent nuclear fuel, such as plutonium.  Many
of these elements not only are extremely harmful to humans, but in addition retain their toxicity
6 See Steven Ebbin & Raphael Kasper, Citizen Groups and the Nuclear Power
Controversy:  Uses of Scientific and Technological Information 10-21 (1974) (discussing growth
of contested AEC license proceedings in the 1960s and early 1970s); Walker, supra note 3, at
387-422 (detailing changes in public views of nuclear power and effect of rise of
environmentalism on the AEC); Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of
Nuclear Power, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 159, 161-77 (1991) (describing increasing public skepticism
of the AEC).
7 See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. IUEW, 367 U.S. 396 (1961); see also 10 C.F.R. part 50
(2004) (Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities); Goldsmith, supra note 6, at
186-91 (describing the NRC’s more recent development of a combined license option). 
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for very long periods, ranging from 600 to millions of years.  Disposing of such waste thus
requires either some form of long-term storage or reprocessing, through which plutonium and
uranium are recovered from spent fuel.  Each of these methods of disposal presents difficulties. 
Long-term storage requires identifying a site that is sufficiently geologically stable to prevent
dissipation of the radioactive elements for the lengthy periods involved—and a community
willing to have such a storage facility nearby.   Reprocessing reduces the amount of high-level
waste requiring disposal but creates substantial security concerns, because it becomes necessary
to control access to the plutonium that reprocessing produces. 
By the early 1970s, the problems involved in dealing with high-level waste were gaining
public attention.   Indeed, commercial use of nuclear power generally was becoming increasingly
contentious, as public concerns grew about the health and safety risks posed by nuclear power
plants.6  Under the Atomic Energy Act and AEC regulations, licensing of nuclear reactors is a
two-stage event; reactor operators first apply for a construction permit and then after the plant is
built, apply for a license to operate it.7  Any interested person affected by grant of a construction
permit or operating license can request a hearing on the application and intervene as a party in the
proceeding.  Such license hearings are considered formal adjudications, and thus trigger the trial-
8  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a).  However, such licensing hearings differ
from formal adjudication under the APA in that they are presided over by three-member atomic
safety and licensing boards, as authorized by the Atomic Energy Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
9 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331, § 4332(2)(c)); Robert
L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1279-90 (1986).
10 For a description of this debate, see Walker, supra note 3, at 363-86.
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type procedures set out in the APA.8   Initially, the statutory right to a hearing was rarely invoked,
but as the number of licenses issued and public concerns about nuclear power increased,
environmental and citizen groups started to seek intervention to oppose new plants.  And these
plant opponents began raising nuclear waste concerns as part of their arguments against the
government licensing proposed facilities.  
Their challenges on this score were buttressed by enactment of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which required federal agencies to issue a detailed
environmental impact statement on major federal actions affecting the quality of the
environment.9   NEPA’s enactment created a substantial dilemma for the AEC.  After some
initial debate, the AEC’s General Counsel’s office came to the view that NEPA applied to the
agency’s licensing and rulemaking decisions.  A harder problem was what to do about nuclear
plants under construction, or already constructed but not yet licensed.  Licensing proceedings on
these plants would take place after NEPA’s effective date of January 1, 1970.  But particularly
for plants authorized and constructed without attention to environmental issues, application of
NEPA had a retroactive aspect, and might necessitate significant retrofitting or perhaps (in
extreme cases) cancellation of planned facilities.  At a minimum, application of NEPA would
lead to substantial delays in plant licensing and construction, to allow for preparation of impact
statements and hearings.10
11 See Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 35 Fed. Reg.
18,469, 18,470 (Dec. 4, 1970).
12 449 F.2d 1109, 1117, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The AEC’s response was to postpone NEPA’s enforcement.  Expressing concerns about
the need for “an orderly transition . . . and to avoid unreasonable delays in the construction and
operation of nuclear power plants urgently needed to meet the national requirements for electric
power,” the AEC prohibited consideration of environmental issues at hearings officially noticed
before March 4, 1971.  In addition, the agency stated it would delay assessment of environmental
factors for plants granted a construction permit before NEPA became effective until the plant
applied for an operating license.11   This timing decision, as well as the AEC’s reluctance to
independently assess environmental effects of proposed plants other than by having staff
promulgate impact statements, provoked great ire on the D.C. Circuit.  In Calvert Cliffs’
Coordinating Committee v. AEC , the D.C. Circuit castigated the AEC for a “crabbed
interpretation of NEPA [that] makes a mockery of the Act,” and characterized the agency’s
timing proposal as a “shocking” delay that “seems to reveal a rather thoroughgoing reluctance to
meet the NEPA procedural obligations in the agency review process.”12  Under the 1971 Calvert
Cliffs’, the AEC was required to consider the environmental impact of all facilities for which
license proceedings were still pending when NEPA became effective, as well as to assess
promptly the environmental impact of facilities under construction to determine if construction
changes were available that might lessen environmental harm caused by the facilities.  Despite
Calvert Cliffs’ disruptive effects, the AEC decided not to seek further review, in part out of
13 See Walker, supra note 3, at 383-84.
14 The firm, Berlin, Roisman and Kessler, was started by Edward Berlin and Gladys
Kessler, in addition to Roisman, in 1969.  Telephone Interview with Anthony Z. Roisman,
Founding Partner, Berlin, Roisman, and Kessler (Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Roisman
Interview].  For a discussion of their decision to start a public interest law firm, see Edward
Berlin, Anthony Z. Roisman, & Gladys Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 675
(1969).
15 For a history of the origins of the NRDC, see Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The
Transformation of the American Environmental Movement 140-43 (1993).
16 Roisman Interview, supra note 14.
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concern to improve the agency’s public image on environmental issues and in part because the
potential for judicial or legislative reversal seemed slim.13 
Calvert Cliffs’ also led to the emergence of a more coordinated opposition to nuclear
plant licensing.  The attorney for the Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee was Anthony
Roisman, a partner at a new public interest law firm in Washington D.C.14  Roisman worked
closely with the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a national environmental law
group founded the year before and funded by the Ford Foundation,15 as well as other
environmental law groups springing up at the same time.  Roisman’s work on Calvert Cliffs’ got
his name circulating as an attorney who would represent citizen groups opposing nuclear plants
before the AEC; up to this point most such groups participated in AEC hearings without benefit
of counsel.16   In particular, Roisman subsequently represented the New England Coalition on
Nuclear Pollution, a group started in 1971 by citizens and scientists from Vermont and western
Massachusetts.  Along with NRDC, the New England Coalition took a lead role in opposing
award of Vermont Yankee’s operating license.  
17 See In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 A.E.C. 776, 777 (Mar. 14, 1972); In
re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 4 A.E.C. 36, 37 (Dec. 8, 1967).
18 The nuclear or uranium fuel cycle refers to the chain of activities associated with
production and ultimate disposal of nuclear fuel.  The “back end” activities are those that occur
after the fuel is burnt in the reactor, the “front end” those that occur beforehand.  For a light-
water reactor such as Vermont Yankee’s, front end activities include: mining and milling
uranium ore; converting uranium oxide to uranium hexafluoride; enriching uranium;
reconversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide; and fabricating nuclear fuel. 
9
Only one environmental group had sought to intervene in the hearing the AEC held on
Vermont Yankee’s application for a construction permit in 1967.  But, as a sign of the changing
climate for nuclear power, seven such organizations intervened when Vermont Yankee
subsequently applied for an operating license for the plant in 1969.17  Vermont Yankee was one
of the plants that would have been exempted from NEPA under the AEC’s proposed policy, as
the hearing on its operating license was noticed in February, 1971.  As a result of Calvert Cliffs’,
however, NEPA now applied.  Indeed, NEPA formed the basis for the intervenors’ main
challenge to award of Vermont Yankee’s operating license:  that the environmental effects
associated with the “back end” of the nuclear fuel cycle—the transportation, reprocessing, and
storage of spent fuel from a plant18—had to be considered in determining whether to award
Vermont Yankee’s license and included in the environmental impact statement on the reactor.
Unfortunately for the intervenors, the atomic safety and license board conducting the
hearing on Vermont Yankee’s operating license took a different view of the scope of NEPA’s
application, and refused to require the AEC staff to include fuel cycle environmental effects.  The
appeal board that reviewed the licensing board’s decision agreed, stating there was “no way of
ascertaining now which of the various reprocessing plants now in existence or to be constructed
will from time to time receive some irradiated fuel elements from [the Vermont Yankee] plant,”
19 See In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station), 4 A.E.C. 930, 933-34 (AEC, Atomic Safety & Licensing App. Bd., 1972); In re
Vermont Yankee Corp., 5 A.E.C. 297 (AEC, Atomic Safety & Licensing App. Bd., 1972); see
also Ebbin & Kasper, supra note 6, at 89-121 (describing Vermont Yankee licensing
proceedings). 
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and new methods of reprocessing might be developed during the Vermont Yankee plant’s
projected forty-year life.  As a result, the appeal board concluded that individual reactor licensing
proceedings should address environmental issues connected to transportation of spent fuel and
other waste from the plant, but not issues related to reprocessing, storage, and disposal of spent
fuel; the latter should instead be addressed in reprocessing plant license proceedings.  Rejecting
the intervenors’ other challenges, the appeal board affirmed the licensing board’s decision to
award Vermont Yankee a temporary operating license.19
The AEC’s commissioners declined to grant further review.  But in November 1972,
shortly after the appeal board’s decision in Vermont Yankee, the AEC proposed issuing a rule on
the question of whether—and how—environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle should be
considered in individual reactor proceedings.  According to the AEC, a generic rule addressing
the environmental effects of the fuel cycle was needed because of the frequency with which the
fuel cycle issue was arising in individual license proceedings.  Vigorous judicial enforcement of
NEPA no doubt also spurred the agency to action.  Prior to NEPA’s enactment, the AEC’s
position had been that it was statutorily precluded from considering environmental concerns
unrelated to radiation.  In 1969, the First Circuit upheld the AEC’s position in a case involving
the Vermont Yankee reactor, rejecting New Hampshire’s claim that the AEC should have
considered the effect that discharge of boiling water from Vermont Yankee would have on the
20   See New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 175 (1st Cir. 1969).
21 See AEC, Environmental Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle S-2 to S-18 & Table S-3A
(November 1972).
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Connecticut River.20  But under NEPA, consideration of environmental effects became part of
every federal agency’s mandate, and the D.C. Circuit’s Calvert Cliffs’ decision made clear that
court would vigorously enforce that mandate.  
In its November 1972 notice of proposed rulemaking, the AEC sought comment on two
regulatory alternatives.  The first expressly followed the approach outlined in the appeal board’s
Vermont Yankee decision and excluded any consideration of environmental effects of the fuel
cycle in individual reactor proceedings, other than those connected to transportation of fuel to
and wastes from the plant.  The second established preset numeric values for environmental
effects associated with different stages of the fuel cycle that the AEC’s regulatory staff would
include in the environmental impact statement on light water nuclear reactors.  These values were
listed in what became the infamous Table S-3 of a lengthy AEC staff report, Environmental
Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, that was made publicly available at the same time as the notice
of proposed rulemaking and represented the primary database for the proposed rule.  To compile
Table S-3, the AEC’s regulatory staff first calculated the annual fuel requirement for a model
light water reactor with a 30-year life, and then normalized the land use, water use, fossil fuel use
and effluent releases for each activity (other than transportation) involved in fabricating and
disposing of this amount of fuel.  To give an example:  the estimate release of liquid uranium or
uranium daughters associated with the model reactor’s annual fuel requirement was 2.4 curies,
with 2 curies released during uranium milling, .33 curies released during uranium hexafluoride
production, and .02 curies released during both fuel enrichment and fuel fabrication.21
22 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed. Supp.
1970) (terming informal rulemaking “ one of the greatest inventions of modern government”);
George P. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1650-51 (1996). 
23 See Rabin, supra note 9, at 264-66; Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 Va.
L. Rev. 447, 452-54 (1986).
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
25 See id. § 553(c).
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The AEC billed the rulemaking an informal proceeding, and thus subject only to the
requirements for informal rulemaking contained in § 553.  Informal rulemaking was one of the
APA’s central innovations.22  While providing a formal rulemaking procedure that embodied
many of the procedural requirements of traditional agency adjudication, the APA additionally
authorized a new, more informal and flexible approach to rulemaking.  Known also as “notice
and comment” rulemaking and codified at § 553, informal rulemaking was modeled more on
legislation than adjudication and by its text was subject to notably few constraints.23  According
to the APA, agencies have to provide a “[g]eneral notice” that, in addition to giving logistical
information and identifying the governing legal authority for the proposed rulemaking, need only
include “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved.”24  Although agencies must receive comments, they can choose whether to hold
an oral hearing or limit participation to written form.  And in promulgating their final rules
agencies only have to “incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose.”25 
Even though not required to do so by § 553, the AEC opted to hold an oral hearing on the
fuel cycle rule at which interested persons could submit oral or written testimony.  The
26 See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 38 Fed. Reg. 49, 49-50 (1973).
27 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1976) (Nos. 76-
419, 76-528) app. at 659-60, 950 [hereinafter Vermont Yankee Appendix].
28 See Michael A. Bauer, The Development of Rulemaking Within the Atomic Energy
Commission: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Valuable Legacy, 27 Admin. L. Rev. 165,
170-73 (1975); Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 171-77; see generally Note, The Use of Generic
Rulemaking to Resolve Environmental Issues in Nuclear Plant Licensing, 61 Va. L. Rev. 869
(1975).
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Commission created a three-member hearing board to preside over the hearing, and authorized it
to question witnesses on their testimony.  It further provided that the rulemaking record would
stay open for 30 days after the hearing for supplemental written comments, thereby providing an
opportunity to respond to testimony and issues that arose at the hearing.26  Critically, however,
the Commission decided not to allow discovery or cross-examination by participants at the
hearing, nor were parties allowed to propose questions for the hearing board to ask.27  This
represented somewhat of a deviation from the AEC’s recent practice; in two other major
rulemakings initiated in 1971—one on emergency core cooling systems for reactors, the other on
whether reactors should be required to keep the radioactivity in effluents as low as
practicable—the AEC had allowed fuller use of adversarial procedures, including cross-
examination.  One result, however, was that these earlier rulemakings were very lengthy and
resource-intensive proceedings; the cooling systems rulemaking, for example, involved more
than 100 days of hearings.28  That experience had surely soured the agency on the idea of using
adjudicatory proceedings for its rulemakings.
On the other hand, greater adversarial procedures would be available if issues involving
the fuel cycle’s environmental effects were addressed in individual reactor hearings, as these
29 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557.
30 Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 837, 842-45, 933.  The closest they came
to such an identification was Roisman’s remarks in passing on the need for further clarification
regarding AEC assurances that nuclear wastes could be safely stored permanently.  Id. at 837. 
This lack of specification led industry representatives to argue, both at the rulemaking and before
the D.C. Circuit, that CNI/UCS had waived their request for cross-examination, a charge the
D.C. Circuit rejected.  See id. at 983-84; NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 643 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
31 See Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 946-49; Roisman Interview, supra
note 14.   For a description of cooling systems rulemaking, see Ebbin & Kasper, supra note 6, at
122-38.
14
hearings are subject to the formal adjudication requirements of the APA.29  This difference led
two groups, the Consolidated National Intervenors (CNI) and Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS), to challenge the rulemaking procedures.  CNI was an umbrella group that included 
numerous environmental and citizen organizations.  Along with UCS, CNI was represented at the
fuel cycle rulemaking by Roisman.  CNI/UCS contended that in order for the fuel cycle rule to be
legally valid, the rulemaking had to employ the same full adjudicatory procedures used to address
safety and environmental issues in individual reactor hearings, and more particularly had to allow
discovery and cross-examination.  Although CNI/UCS repeatedly requested a hearing on the fuel
cycle’s environmental effects where rights of cross-examination and discovery would be
provided, for the most part these groups did not identify specific testimony at the hearing that
required further exploration.30  Instead, motivating CNI/UCS’ demand for cross-examination and
discovery was their belief, derived from their experience with the recent cooling systems
rulemaking, that only through these means could they uncover potential concerns raised by
second-level staff which were not included in the Environmental Survey or in the testimony of
top AEC officials.31
32 A preliminary hearing to go over logistical details of the hearing was held on January
17, 1973.  Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 655-99.
33 See John C. Geyer, ASCE Honorary Member, Dies at 89, Civ. Engineering, Oct. 1985,
at 72-73; Who’s Who in America 4985 (58th ed. 2004) (biography of Martin Steindler); Comm. on
Mixed Wastes, Nat’l Research Council, The State of Development of Waste Forms for Mixed
Wastes 125-26 (1999) (same). 
34 See The Communications Act: A Legislative History of the Major Amendments, 1934-
1996 xxiii (Max D. Paglin ed., 1999).
35 Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 647-1186.
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A two-day hearing on the fuel cycle rule was held in February 1973.32  Presiding over the
hearing was a three-member hearing board consisting of Max Paglin, Dr. Martin Steindler, and
Dr. John Geyer.  Two of these, Steindler and Geyer, were scientists with expertise on the nuclear
fuel cycle and radioactive waste management; Steindler, for example, subsequently served on
advisory committees on nuclear wastes for both the National Academy of Science and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  Steindler, who worked at the AEC’s Argonne National
Laboratory, had served as an AEC consultant in the past, while Geyer, located at John Hopkins,
had sat on numerous AEC atomic safety and licensing boards.33  Paglin, in turn, was an
experienced administrative lawyer—a former General Counsel and Executive Director of the
Federal Communications Commission—who served as a permanent member and chairman of
atomic safety and licensing boards for the AEC and NRC from 1972-75.34  A broad range of
organizations and interests testified at the hearing, including representatives of the AEC, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state governments, environmental and citizen groups,
and the nuclear power industry.  The hearing generated a lengthy record; testimony and selections
of the written comments comprise over five hundred pages of the appendix submitted to the
Supreme Court.35  At times, the hearing board engaged in active questioning, in particular asking
36 See Environmental Survey, supra note 21, at S-17 to S-19 (Table S-3A).
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the AEC official in charge of producing the Environmental Survey, S. H. Smiley, detailed
questions about how the AEC’s regulatory staff derived the values listed in Table S-3.
From the perspective of the subsequent judicial decisions, the most important testimony
at the hearing was that of Dr. Frank Pittman, director of the AEC’s waste management and
transportation division.  As originally issued, Environmental Survey did not include discussion of
techniques for disposing of high-level wastes, and thus Pittman’s testimony constituted the main
support for the fact that Table S-3 assigned no environmental effects to waste storage and
disposal other than the permanent commitment of land for a storage facility.36  Indeed, his
testimony provided the most detailed statement yet issued of the AEC’s plans for dealing with
such wastes.  As outlined by Dr. Pittman, the AEC’s assumption, in line with federal policy at the
time, was that spent nuclear fuel from reactors would be reprocessed.  Its plan was to construct a
surface facility for storing high-level waste generated by reprocessing until a permanent geologic
waste disposal site could be developed.  Pittman provided schematic drawings of what the
surface facility would look like and described how wastes would enter the facility and be stored.
Even so, Dr. Pittman offered few specifics regarding key aspects of the facilities.  For
example, he provided little explanation of how a failure of the cooling system in the surface
facility would be prevented or rectified, other than to claim that it would take over a week for the
cooling water to boil away, allowing any of “[v]arious corrective actions” to be taken.   More
notably, he provided few details about the AEC’s plans for a permanent facility, other than
stating that the Commission expected to develop a site containing salt-beds and describing a plan
for a pilot facility once a site was identified.  Nonetheless, Pittman was confident that the safety
37 See Statement of Dr. Frank Pittman, Director of Waste Management and
Transportation, AEC, reprinted in Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 777-78, 782-83,
791; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 91-94 (1983) (discussing the
incorporation of this zero-release assumption in Table S-3); Environmental Survey, supra note
21, at S-19 (Table S-3A).
38 Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 830-35.  Dr. Pittman’s initial testimony
was in the first morning session of the hearing, but the board postponed its questioning of him
until the afternoon.  See id. 801, 827, 829-30.  This delay may explain why the D.C. Circuit
erroneously stated that the hearing board had not subjected Dr. Pittman to any questioning.  See
infra note 91.
17
and environmental impact of the proposed facilities was minimal.  In his words, concerns raised
regarding management of nuclear wastes were a “bugaboo” that “cannot logically be used as a
rationale for delays in the progress of an essential technology.”  He argued that the AEC’s plan
assured “commercial high-level waste will be managed safely,” characterizing the possibility of a
meltdown at the surface facility as “incredible,” and concluding the probability that the AEC
would be able to develop an acceptable long-term bedded-salt facility was “very high.”  Indeed,
the presumption that wastes could be permanently stored without any release of radioactivity was
incorporated into Table S-3, which contained no entry for the environmental impact of such
releases.37 
Although the hearing board asked Dr. Pittman some questions regarding operation of and
need for the surface facility, they did not seek further details on the permanent facility.38  Greater
concerns with Pittman’s testimony and the problems of waste storage were raised by CNI/UCS.
Anthony Roisman, who began his testimony immediately after the board finished questioning Dr.
Pittman, stated “we are not satisfied with Mr. Pittman’s well intentioned, but, we think, not at all
well explained position with regard to the ability to handle nuclear waste for thousands of years.
He has . . . referred to it as a program of perpetual management. . . . I think the public deserves
39 Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra note 27, at 837–38.
40 See id. at 843, 888–97, 904-05.  UCS elaborated on these criticisms in supplemental
comments submitted after the oral hearing was complete, describing the discussion of waste
storage in the Environmental Survey (amended to include Dr. Pittman’s testimony) as “replete
with bland reassurances that problems can be solved even though the full extent and seriousness
of these problems are not presented and explored.” Id., at 1069, 1081-98.
41 See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 6 A.E.C. 539, 541 (July 6, 1973)
[hereinafter Hearing Board Report].
42 For a detailed discussions of the relevant D.C. Circuit precedent, see Antonin Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345,
348-52; Stephen F. Williams,“Hybrid Rulemaking” under the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 401, 425-36 (1974).
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the right to ask the question, What does that mean?”39  Roisman additionally noted prior
problems the AEC had encountered with waste disposal, as did a subsequent CNI/UCS witness,
Dr. Henry Kendall of MIT.  Kendall also testified to security risk of diversion associated with
transportation of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.40
As instructed by the Commission, the hearing board produced a report identifying the
issues raised by the hearing.41  One main issue identified by the board was CNI/UCS’ procedural
challenge.  According to CNI/UCS, existing case law supported their claim for an adjudicatory
proceeding providing rights of cross-examination and discovery.  At the time of the fuel cycle
hearing in February 1973, this was a debatable proposition.42  In a 1966 decision, American
Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, the en banc D.C. Circuit had noted that procedures in
addition to those set out in § 553 at times might be necessary to ensure a fair hearing.   But this
language was dictum as the court refused to require additional procedures in that case,
emphasizing that the Civil Aeronautics Board “did not limit itself to minimum procedures” in
issuing the cargo service rule there at issue, and in particular had provided opportunity for oral
43 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied,  385 U.S. 843 (1966);
see also Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (invoking
American Airlines and statutory requirement of notice and hearing to support conclusion that
fairness required opportunity for cross-examination on the crucial issues involved in tomato
marketing regulation); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC,  420 F.2d 577, 589 & n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (also suggesting in dictum that in some cases “brief and oral argument” might
not be sufficient to air certain issues).
44 American Airlines,  359 F.2d at 628-32.
45 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring “some sort of adversary,
adjudicative-type procedures” and describing APA’s provisions for informal and formal
rulemaking as creating a spectrum of possible procedures rather than either-or procedural
requirements).
46 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  Similarly, in a January 1974 decision,
O’ Donnell v. Shaffer,  the D.C. Circuit upheld a rule promulgated using § 553 procedures but
stated “ [t]his Court has long recognized that basic considerations of fairness may dictate
procedural requirements not specified by Congress.  Oral submissions . . .and cross-examination
may be necessary if critical issues cannot otherwise be resolved.”  491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
47 Int’l Harvester, 478 F.2d at 649.
48 Id. at 631.
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argument.43  More importantly, American Airlines upheld an agency’s power to issue rules
without providing full adjudicatory procedures, even if the issues addressed by the rules would
otherwise be dealt with in a hearing where such procedures would apply.44  The D.C. Circuit
subsequently required use of procedures beyond those required by § 553 in two 1973 cases
involving informal rulemaking, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC45 and International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelhaus.46  International Harvester in particular had held that at least some limited right of
cross-examination might be needed to ensure fair ventilation of the issues.47  The International
Harvester court also expressed approval for the technique of having a hearing officer screen and
ask questions submitted in advance by participants,48 but the AEC had not employed that
procedure in the fuel cycle rulemaking.  Neither Mobil Oil or International Harvester, however,
49 See id. at 629-31, 648-49 (discussing statutory requirement of “public hearing” on
applications for suspension of auto emission standards and justifying additional procedures on
the ground that “[t]he procedures followed in this case . . . have resulted in a record that leaves
this court uncertain, at a minimum, whether the essentials of the intention of Congress [in
authorizing suspensions] were achieved.”); Mobil Oil, 483 F.2d at 1258-59 (emphasizing
statutory requirement of substantial evidence review, which it read as entailing that “the
proceedings must provide some mechanism for introduce adverse evidence and criticize evidence
introduced by others”).  Mobil Oil is further distinguishable by the fact that the court expressed
doubt that the Federal Power Commission had even met the notice requirements of § 553.  See
id. at 1251 n.39.
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mandated additional procedures in every informal rulemaking, and the AEC had already gone
beyond the requirements of § 553 in formulating the fuel cycle rule.  Moreover, both decisions
were potentially distinguishable, as the D.C. Circuit had emphasized provisions of the underlying
organic statutes in mandating additional procedures.49
  Thus, by the time the AEC addressed CNI/UCS’ procedural complaint in April 1974, the
D.C. Circuit had displayed its willingness to mandate rulemaking procedures beyond those
required by § 553, and in particular its support for giving participants some opportunity to
participate in questioning.  On the other hand, agency counsel had a basis for advising the AEC
that precedent did not demand procedures beyond those the AEC had provided, and accepting
CNI/UCS’ procedural challenge at that point would have required reopening the rulemaking,
with substantial potential for delay.  Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the Commission rejected
CNI/UCS’ argument.  Concluding that the procedures used were “more than adequate,” it
emphasized that no proffered evidence was excluded and that CNI/UCS did not “make an offer
of proof—or even remotely suggest—what substantive matters it would develop under different
50 See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188, 14,189
(Apr. 22, 1974).
51 See Hearing Board Report, supra note 41, at 542–543.  Additional issues involved,
inter alia, the possibility of sabotage, the treatment of pending license cases, the feasibility of the
proposed alternatives, and access to the background materials and calculations used by the
AEC’s regulatory staff in generating the Survey.  See id. at 544–45.
52  See Walker, supra note 3, at 24-25; Philip M. Boffey, Radioactive Waste Site Search
Gets Into Deep Water, 190 Science 361 (1975).  By mid-1975, a subsequent effort to develop a
long-term storage facility in salt-beds in New Mexico had also proved unsuccessful.  See id.
53 See Yellin, supra note 3, at 535-36.
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procedures.”50  The Commission also underscored that the regulatory staff had made various
drafts and notes used in preparing the Environmental Survey publicly available.
The remaining issues identified by the hearing board were more substantive.  In
particular, the Environmental Survey was challenged as inadequate, due to its failure to include
analysis of the environmental effects associated with waste reprocessing and storage.51  As the
CNI/UCS witnesses noted, at the time of the hearing the AEC had already encountered
difficulties in dealing with nuclear wastes.  Other countries, in particular France, had active
reprocessing plants.  But in the United States only one commercial reprocessing plant had been
built, and that plant shut down in 1972—six years after it began operations—because of technical
and financial problems.  In 1970, the AEC announced plans to develop a long-term geologic
storage repository in salt-beds in Lyons, Kansas.  However, by 1972 the agency was forced to
acknowledge that the site was unsuitable for a long-term facility, due to abandoned gas and oil
drill holes in the area and a neighboring mine that used large amounts of water to remove salt, all
of which raised the danger that the facility might be breached, allowing radioactive wastes to
escape.52  In addition, sizeable leaks of stored high-level waste had occurred at the AEC’s facility
in Hanford, Washington.53
54 See NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1978); infra text accompanying notes
139-44 (describing process leading to development of Yucca Mountain site).  For similar
assessments of Dr. Pittman’s testimony, see Scalia, supra note 42, at 353; Richard B. Stewart,
Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1805, 1809-
10 (1978).  For a more favorable view, see Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts’
Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1833, 1841-42 (1978).
55 See infra Part II (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s emerging administrative law
jurisprudence).
56 478 F.2d 615, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973 ) (faulting the EPA for, on prior remand, not responding to
comments criticizing data the agency had used to formulate emission standards under the Clean
Air Act and instead simply including the comments in the rulemaking record on the standards).
57 See Hearing Board Report, supra note 41, at 543; Vermont Yankee Appendix, supra
note 27, at 830-351
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Given these problems and the lack of detail in Dr. Pittman’s testimony, the D. C.
Circuit’s description of his remarks “as vague, but glowing” seems not only fair but overly
kind.54  Whether agency counsel could have predicted that the D.C. Circuit would find Pittman’s
testimony so inadequate as to necessitate a remand is a closer call, as the D.C. Circuit had only
recently begun to tighten scrutiny of agency rulemaking.55  On the other hand, it did not require
prescience to predict that the D.C. Circuit might look askance at agency acceptance of Dr.
Pittman’s conclusory assurances.  Arguably, therefore, agency counsel should have advised the
Commission to supplement the record on waste storage or to heed the D.C. Circuit’s admonition
in International Harvester and engage in “candid discussion” of weaknesses in Pittman’s
testimony.56  Perhaps indeed the AEC’s General Counsel did suggest such measures, but if so the
Commissioners ignored counsel’s advice.  Instead, both the hearing board and the Commission
viewed Pittman’s testimony in highly positive terms.  The hearing board described Dr. Pittman as
having offered “an extensive presentation” on waste disposal options and their environmental
effects, and subjected him to minimal questioning.57  The Commission agreed, stating that
58 See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, supra note 50, at 14,189.
59 See id, at 14,188, 14,190-91; see also In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 6
A.E.C. 358, 358 (AEC, Atomic Safety & Licen. App. Bd., 1973) (upholding award of Vermont
Yankee’s permanent operating license).
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“considerable information was presented at the hearing on high level waste storage.”  It
dismissed concerns that estimates of the storage facilities’ effects were unreliable because the
facilities did not yet exist on the grounds that the proposed facilities would use already existing
technology.58  It also found that the now-revised Environmental Survey, amended in response to
the hearing to among other things include Dr. Pittman’s written testimony on waste storage,
provided an adequate basis for the values listed in the Survey’s Table S-3. 
 In its final fuel cycle rule, the AEC opted for the second proposed alternative, inclusion
of predetermined values in the environmental impact statements issued for individual reactors.
The agency thus ultimately adopted an approach to the fuel cycle’s environmental effects that
differed from the approach outlined by the appeal board in the Vermont Yankee proceeding, and
it stated that the Vermont Yankee decision would have “no further precedential significance.” 
However, the AEC also decided not to apply the new rule to previously issued environmental
impact statements, on the ground that the fuel cycle’s environmental effects were “relatively
insignificant.”  As a result, Vermont Yankee was allowed to retain its operating license, which
had become permanent in February 1973, without further proceedings.59
Similarly exempted from the new rule was the grant of a construction permit to
Consumers Power Company to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan.  The proposed
reactors were across a river from a major Dow Chemical facility, which had agreed to purchase
steam generated by the plants.  Indeed, proximity to the Dow facility was the reason why
60 Public support was also fueled by a rumor that failure to construct the reactors would
cause Dow to leave Midland.  See Ebbin & Kasper, supra note 6, at 21-22.
61 See Ron Winslow, Woman Helps Sink Nuclear Power Plant That Cost $4 Billion — 
Mary Sinclair's 15-Year Drive In Midland, Mich., Ends in Ostracism — and Victory, Wall St. J.,
July 18, 1984, at 1; Jerry M. Flint, Midland, Mich., Wants Nuclear Plant, N.Y.Times, Dec., 3,
1971, at 24.
62 See John R. Emshwiller, Nuclear Nemesis: Using the Law’s Delay, Myron Cherry
Attacks Atomic-Power Projects, Wall. St. J., Mar. 10, 1978, at A1, 35.
24
Consumers chose Midland as the site for the reactors.  Most Midland residents strongly favored
the project; Dow was Midland’s biggest employer and supported a wide range of cultural and
charitable activities in the city.60  The few who disagreed faced significant community ostracism. 
One was Mary Sinclair, who organized the Saginaw Valley Nuclear Study Group to oppose the
reactors.  Her mailbox was bombed, her children were harassed in school, and she was forced out
of her church.  But Sinclair gained one key ally, the eldest daughter of Dow Chemical’s founder,
who provided the funds Saginaw needed to hire Myron Cherry.  Cherry was a Chicago lawyer
with an abrasive style who, like Roisman, was gaining a reputation as a fierce opponent of
nuclear power plants.  Cherry had played a lead role in the AEC core cooling systems
rulemaking, and also participated in the fuel cycle rulemaking.  Represented by Cherry, Saginaw
and several other groups intervened in the Consumers Power proceeding, as did a group of
residents from nearby Mapleton, Michigan, led by a local businessman named Nelson
Aeschliman.61  
Cherry’s strategy was to strongly contest license applications and draw out licensing
proceedings as long as possible, thereby inflicting costly delays on plant operators.62  He pursued
this strategy to the hilt in the Consumers Power proceeding:  Consumers filed its construction
permit application in January 1969, and the proceeding was not resolved until May 1973.  Part of
63 See In re Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Unit 1 and 2), 5 A.E.C. 214,
216 (AEC, Atomic Safety & Licensing Bd., 1972).
64 The law review article in question was Arthur W. Murphy, The National
Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency
Coup de Grace?, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 963 (1972). 
65 Indeed, Saginaw failed to participate in the hearing on Midland’s environmental effects. 
Cherry explained this absence as stemming from his need to attend the ongoing cooling systems
rulemaking, and the conflict in hearing dates was another bone of contention in the Midland
proceedings.  See In re Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), 6 A.E.C. 331,
332-33, 352-53 (AEC, Atomic Safety & Licensing App. Bd., May 18, 1973)
66 See id.  For a detailed description of the Midland proceeding, see Ebbin & Kasper,
supra note 6, at 59-89.
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the reason for the length of the proceeding was, again, Calvert Cliffs’.  That decision was issued
on the last day of the hearing on Consumers Power’s construction permit, July 23, 1971,
necessitating holding a supplemental fourteen day hearing in May-June 1972 devoted solely to
environmental issues.63  As a whole, the Consumers Power proceeding was extremely
contentious, with Saginaw attacking the chair of the licensing board as biased because of
comments he made in a law review article.64  In turn, the AEC castigated Saginaw for failing to
provide evidence to support many of its environmental challenges, including Saginaw’s claim
that alternatives such as energy conservation made the proposed reactor unnecessary.65  In the
end, the AEC rejected the intervenors’ challenges and awarded Consumers Power its
construction permit, with the appeal board again reaffirming its refusal to consider most
environmental aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle in an individual reactor licensing.66
II. Vermont Yankee at the D.C. Circuit
The next step in all three proceedings—the individual license proceedings for the
Vermont Yankee and Consumers Power reactors and the fuel cycle rulemaking—was review
67 For general discussions of the D.C. Circuit during this period and its role in developing
judicial review of agency action, see Christopher P. Banks, Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit
Court 1-50 (1999); Jeffrey Brandon Morris, Calmly to Poise the Scales of Justice: A History of
the Courts of the District of Columbia Circuit 194-235, 279-315 (2001).
68 Patricia M. Wald, Ghosts of Judges Past, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 675, 681 (1993).
69 See Fred Barbash, Judge Bazelon’s Network: The Salon of the Ultimate Liberal, Wash.
Post, Mar. 1, 1981, at A2; Abner J. Mikva, The Real Judge Bazelon, 82 Geo. L. J. 1 (1993);
Patricia M. Wald, Lessons Amid Losses, Am. Lawyer, Mar. 9, 1993 at 9. 
70 The discussion in this and subsequent paragraphs on developments in administrative
law and the debate over judicial review on the D.C. Circuit draws heavily on the following
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before the D.C. Circuit.  The D.C. Circuit at the time was something of a first among equals,
composed of legal luminaries such as David Bazelon, Harold Leventhal, Skelly Wright, and Carl
McGowan, to name just a few; Chief Justice Warren Burger had also been a member before his
elevation to the Supreme Court.67  Bazelon, the Circuit’s longtime Chief Judge, was renowned
for his commitment to using the law as a tool of social change, writing influential decisions that
expanded the rights of criminal defendants and developed the insanity defense.  In the words of
one of his colleagues, “[a] restrained judge he was not.”68  Judge Bazelon was also famous for the
lunches he organized in a backroom of Milton Kronheim’s liquor warehouse, where liberals from
across Washington would gather.69  
The D.C. Circuit’s stature as the nation’s administrative law court developed in the late
1960s and 1970s.  Congress chose to make the D.C. Circuit the center for challenges to
administrative regulations issued under new federal environmental and health statutes, such as
the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  In addition, sparked by
the Nixon administration’s opposition to its liberal criminal and poverty law decisions, Congress
ended the D.C. Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction over local D.C. courts, giving it more time to
focus on administrative cases.70  As its administrative docket grew, the D.C. Circuit began to
sources:  Rabin, supra note 9, at 1278-1315; Scalia, supra note 42; Richard B. Stewart, The
Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 725-40
(1976); Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1389 (1996); and 
The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin. L. Rev. 507 (1988)
(remarks by Chief Judge Wald).
71 See, e.g., American Airlines, 359 F.2d 624, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc);
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law in the Seventies § 6:04-1, at 217-19 (1976);  Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1305-15 (1975); see generally Robert
W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for
Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 Cal. L. Rev. 1276 (1972). 
72 See Paul Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185, 205-
214 (1974).
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develop new administrative law doctrines and expand the scope of judicial review, particularly of
informal rulemaking.
Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s did use of informal rulemaking become
widespread, in part because many of the new statutes mandated that agencies issue standards and
generally applicable regulations.  This move to informal rulemaking was generally hailed as a
salutary development.  It allowed agencies to develop policy in a more coherent and consistent
manner that provided greater opportunities for public comment than individualized adjudications,
while avoiding the heavy resource burdens and delays that accompanied formal rulemaking.71 
Yet the growth in informal rulemaking also raised concerns about loss of procedural protections
and agency accountability.  The substantial economic and social impact of the new regulations
meant that arbitrary agency decisionmaking could exert significant harm, while the complex
factual questions and issues of scientific and technical uncertainty underlying the regulations
provided ample room for debate about the correctness of agency determinations.72   The fuel
cycle rulemaking was a good case in point:  Determining the values to include in Table S-3
required the Commission to make factual estimates about the environmental impact of waste
73 See Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039
(1997). 
74 See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (transferring responsibilities of the Energy
Research and Development Administration; to the newly created Department of Energy); see
also Walker, supra note 3, at 417-25 (describing criticisms of the AEC as too soft on the nuclear
industry); Robert J. Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America 103-22 (1997) (describing origins and
enactment of the 1974 legislation).
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storage, notwithstanding the uncertainty regarding how wastes ultimately would be stored.  The
Commission’s erring too much towards either conservatism or laxity in its estimates could have
serious effects on society and commercial nuclear power.  
Moreover, at the same time as agencies were engaging in greater use of informal
rulemaking and regulating in new areas, suspicion was growing about willingness of agencies to
take public interests seriously.  Agencies increasingly were seen not as the embodiment of
impartial expertise, but as entities that had become captured by the industries they regulated.73 
The AEC was a particular target for such concerns about agency capture.  The Atomic Energy
Act had given the agency the incompatible responsibilities of both regulating and promoting the
commercial nuclear industry.  Concern that the AEC had sacrificed public health and safety in
order to foster commercial uses of nuclear power led Congress in 1974 to abolish the AEC.  Its
regulatory duties were transferred to an independent agency, the NRC, while its research and
promotional activities were first assigned to the Energy Research and Development
Administration and subsequently given over to the Department of Energy.74
The D.C. Circuit’s response to these concerns was to subject agency decisionmaking to
more intensive scrutiny.  Enhanced judicial review was seen as the means by which agency
accountability would be preserved; in the words of the Calvert Cliffs’ decision, it fell to the
75  Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
76 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
77 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also Peter Strauss’ comment on Overton Park in this
volume.
78 See, e.g., Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (describing AEC as
unique in the breadth of its discretion and in close supervision by Congress through the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy).
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courts to ensure that “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”75  In this scheme, “ agencies
and courts together constitute a partnership in furtherance of the public interest.”76  The D.C.
Circuit was not alone in thus expanding the role of the courts in regulation.  Indeed, the Supreme
Court seemed to signal that change was afoot with its 1971 decision in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, which—while stating that courts should not substitute their views for
those of an agency—also required that judicial review be “searching and careful.”77  But it was
the D.C. Circuit that most clearly developed a new approach to informal rulemaking.  The new
climate of judicial review extended to decisions of the AEC.  That agency previously had
received gentle treatment at the hands of the D.C. Circuit,78 but Calvert Cliffs’ signaled that those
halcyon days were largely over. 
Although the D.C. Circuit was in agreement on the need for greater judicial oversight of
agency decisionmaking, a deep debate raged on that court about the form this oversight should
take.  According to Judge Bazelon, courts lacked the technical competence to assess the scientific
evidence underlying many of the new regulations.  As a result:
[T]he best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous
administrative decisions is not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the
technical merits of each decision.  Rather, it is to establish a decision-making
79 Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in result); see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring); see generally David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology through the Legal
Process, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 817 (1977).
80 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring); see generally Harold
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509
(1973).  Judge Wright took a similar view.  See J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking
Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 403 (1973). 
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process that assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the
scientific community and the public.79  
But several of his colleagues argued that courts lacked authority to impose procedural mandates
not based in statutes or the Constitution, and worried that imposition of additional procedures
would undermine informal rulemaking’s advantages.  Instead, they argued courts must undertake
searching substantive review of agency decisionmaking.  The most prominent advocate of this
view was Judge Leventhal, who also coined the phrase “hard look” review by which such
substantive scrutiny came to be known.  Leventhal insisted courts could undertake such scrutiny
without intruding on agencies’ policy prerogatives.  Regardless, they had no choice but to steep
themselves in the substantive details of the underlying subject matter:
[W]hile giving up is the easier course, it is not legitimately open to us at present. 
Our present system of review assumes judges will acquire whatever technical
knowledge is necessary as background for decision of the legal questions. 
. . .
 . . .  Better no judicial review at all than a charade that gives the imprimatur
without the substance of judicial confirmation that the agency is not acting
unreasonably.80 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s debate between procedural and substantive review was carried out
over several years in the pages of the F.2d, without a clear victor emerging.  In some decisions,
such as International Harvester, the D.C. Circuit appeared to opt for the proceduralist approach,
requiring the agency to employ some form of cross-examination on remand even though such
81 See 478 F.2d at 649 (requiring “some opportunity for cross-examination” on remand);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Corp., 483 F.2d 1238, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasizing the
importance of adversarial procedures to providing substantial evidence to support agency
decisions); American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d, 624, 631-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) (noting court’s willingness to require oral hearings in rulemakings
even where not required by Congress); see also Scalia, supra note 42, at 348-52; Williams, supra
note 42, at 425-36 (arguing that D.C. Circuit decisions seeming to require additional cross-
examination in fact had a minimal impact on agency practice).
82 486 F.2d 375, 392-94 & n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  Other examples of this approach to
§ 553 are United States v. Nova Scotia Foods Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977)
(adopting similar approach to § 553's notice and concise general statement requirements);
Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (warning
against agencies reading § 553’s requirement of “a concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis
and purpose” too literally).
83 See 462 F.2d 846, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Greater Boston Television Corp.,
444 F.2d 841, 851-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing agency obligation to “articulate with
reasonable clarity its reasons for decision and identify the significance of the crucial facts,”
thereby ensuring for the court that it has taken “a hard look at the salient problems”) (internal
quotations omitted).
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procedure was not required by § 553.81  In others, however, the court justified its procedural
impositions as stemming from § 553 itself.  Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, a 1973
decision, demonstrates this approach of putting a heavy interpretive gloss on the procedures
actually required by § 553; the D. C. Circuit there read § 553’s minimal notice demand as
requiring publication of material on which an agency is relying.82  But at the same time, several
D.C. Circuit decisions instead based their procedural demands on the prerequisites for adequate
judicial review.  Thus, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v . EPA, a 1972 decision, the court held that
the EPA satisfied § 553’s concise and general statement requirement in setting standards for
sulfur oxide.  Yet it nonetheless remanded the standard to the agency for fuller explanation,
emphasizing that “the provision for statutory judicial review contemplates some disclosure of the
basis of the agency’s action.”83   And many decisions justified the demands put on agencies on
multiple grounds.  In Portland Cement, for example—a Leventhal decision—the court relied not
84 See 486 F.2d at 402. 
85 For example, in holding that the EPA was not subject to NEPA’s environmental impact
statement in promulgating standards under section 111 of the CAA, the Portland Cement the
court emphasized that “an EPA statement of reasons for standards and criteria [under the CAA]
“require a fuller presentation than the minimum rulemaking requirement of the [APA].”  Id. at
386. 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d), historical and statutory notes; Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, H. Rep. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 318-25 (1977).
87 See, e.g., Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 393 n. 67; Stewart, supra note 70, at 762-67;
see generally Williams, supra note 42.
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only on § 553’s requirements but also on the courts’ responsibility to steep themselves in
technical matters so as to ensure agencies have undertaken reasoned decisionmaking.84  However
justified, the bottom-line effect of these D.C. Circuit decisions was the same: the development of
“hybrid rulemaking,” which engrafted more formal procedural elements, including often greater
participation rights but at a minimum a substantial paper hearing, onto informal rulemaking
under § 553.  
Many of these decisions, in particular Portland Cement, Kennecott Copper, and
International Harvester, involved the CAA.  That statutory context might, at least in theory, help
explain these decisions, as the court emphasized that the CAA imposed greater record and
explanation requirements than contained in the APA.85  Perhaps more importantly, the 1977
Amendments to the CAA imposed detailed procedural requirements that essentially codified and
expanded on the D.C. Circuit’s hybrid rulemaking precedent.86  This suggests that these decisions
could have been read as limited to the CAA context.  On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit never
indicated that it viewed these decisions as so limited, and on the contrary alluded to § 553 as well
as the CAA.  Nor have commentators, at the time or historically, viewed the decisions as CAA-
specific.87  What the 1977 CAA amendment do demonstrate, however, is that in some instances
88 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (imposing detailed record, notice, and justification
requirements on rulemaking under the CAA, including requiring that interested persons be given
an opportunity for oral hearing and that promulgated rules respond to significant comments,
criticisms, and new data submitted during the comment period); The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (providing right to require Secretary of Labor to hold an
oral hearing on proposed safety or health standards); 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 7.7 at 485-
92 (Richard J. Pierce, Jr., ed., 2002) (describing other statutes with hybrid rulemaking
requirements).
89 See 547 F.2d 633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
90 Although identifying reprocessing as another area where “detailed explanation and
support for the staff’s conclusions was noticeably absent from the Environmental Survey,” id. at
647, the opinion did not provide further discussion of why the agency’s treatment of reprocessing
issues was inadequate.
91 Id. at 647-53.  The court initially identified the hearing board’s failure to question Dr.
33
Congress was the source of such hybrid rulemaking requirements, expressly mandating that
agencies provide detailed notice, hold oral hearings on proposed rules, and (more rarely)
requiring cross-examination.88
The D.C. Circuit’s decisions on the fuel cycle rule and the two licensing proceedings
reflected its turn to more searching review of informal rulemaking and agency decisionmaking
more generally.  In Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, an opinion written by Judge
Bazelon, the court held those portions of the fuel cycle rule addressing waste disposal and
reprocessing to be arbitrary and capricious, and remanded the rule to the agency.89   The court
found Dr. Pittman’s testimony conclusory and his optimistic assessments of the risks posed by
nuclear waste unexplained, adding that the NRC (substituted as the defendant for the now
defunct AEC) compounded the problem by ignoring these deficiencies.90  “Without a thorough
exploration of the problems involved in waste disposal, including past mistakes, and a forthright
assessment of uncertainties and differences in expert opinion, this type of agency action cannot
pass muster as reasoned decisionmaking.”91  Moreover, “[m]any procedural devices for creating a
Pittman as an example of the agency’s insufficient probing.  Upon being notified by the NRC
that in fact the hearing board had questioned Dr. Pittman, the court simply deleted these
references but did not otherwise alter its opinion.  See Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief &
Supplemental Appendix, No. 76-419, at 1-2, app. 1-2.  The original decision is reprinted in the
appendix to Vermont Yankee’s petition for certiorari, see Petitioner’s Brief for Certiorari, app. 1-
59, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419).
92 Natural Resources Defense Council, 547 F.2d at 653-54.
93 Id. at 644.
94 The opinion is also unclear as to whether, to the extent additional procedures are
required, they stem ultimately from NEPA, the APA, due process, or a generalized common law
requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.  Although noting at the outset that under NEPA
agencies must consider contrary scientific opinion on adverse environmental effects, and that the
public interest intervenors’ primary complaint was that the procedures used denied their due
process right to participate meaningfully in the proceedings, see id. at 643, 646, most of the
opinion either refers to APA requirements or speaks in more general terms.
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genuine dialogue on these issues were available to the agency.”  Although purporting “not to
intrude on the agency’s province by dictating to it which, if any, of these devices it must adopt to
flesh out the record,” the opinion concluded that “[w]hatever techniques the Commission adopts,
before it promulgates a rule limiting further consideration of waste disposal and reprocessing
issues, it must in one way or another generate a record in which the factual issues are fully
developed.”92
The question left hanging by the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was precisely where the court
thought the NRC had gone astray.  Was it the failure to provide opportunity for “genuine
dialogue,” through cross-examination, discovery, or other procedures, that would have ensured a
“thorough ventilation of the issues”?93  Was it instead the agency’s failure to produce a record
that demonstrated such ventilation, however obtained?  The opinion is a masterpiece of
obfuscation on this point.94  In support of the latter view is the fact that, despite frequent
references to the value of additional adversarial procedures, the opinion repeatedly describes its
95 See, e.g., id. at 644, 654.
96 See id. at 658-61.
97 Id. at 656.
98 See id. at 641 n.17.
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ultimate concern as being to ensure the agency adequately considered the issues at stake.95  Yet it
is hard to read the opinion except as demanding the NRC provide greater opportunities for public
participation on remand, even if not specifying the exact shape these procedures must take.  One
member of the panel, Judge Tamm, took such a view, and therefore concurred only in the result
even though he agreed that the record was inadequate to sustain the rule.96  Judge Tamm
criticized the majority for issuing a procedural mandate, leading to the oddity of Judge Bazelon
issuing a separate statement to his own opinion, in which he urged agencies to adopt
“innovat[ive] procedural formats” that better ensure accurate factfinding on complex scientific
and technical issues or in areas where formal adjudicatory procedures traditionally were the
norm.97  Judge Bazelon’s separate opinion reinforces the impression that the majority did indeed
intend the NRC to provide additional adjudicatory procedures on remand.
The court also remanded the individual licensing decisions.  Although affirming the
NRC’s authority to treat the environmental effects of the fuel cycle issue through generic
rulemaking, the court rejected the appeal board’s claim that it was impossible to assess such
environmental effects in the context of an individual reactor proceeding.  Ruling that these
environment effects must be adequately considered at some point—either in generic or individual
proceedings—the court also remanded the grant of Vermont Yankee’s operating license.98 
Moreover, in a decision again written by Judge Bazelon, but for a different panel, the D.C.
Circuit found that the AEC had erred in granting Consumers Power a construction permit for its
99 See Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 627-31 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also id. at 631
(instructing the NRC to take into account changes in Dow Chemical’s need for process steam in
redoing the cost-benefit analysis for the environmental impact statement to include fuel cycle
environmental effects).
100 Id. at 624 n.4.
101 The decision in Aeschliman was held by the court first for the AEC to consider
motions to reopen and then pending the decision in the fuel cycle rulemaking.  See id.
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Midland plant.  The AEC’s exclusion of any consideration of the environmental effects of the
fuel cycle in evaluating the proposed reactors’ environmental impact was one reason for the
reversal.  But the D.C. Circuit additionally faulted the Commission for failing to seek greater
clarification of a statutorily-mandated independent safety report and for not investigating energy
conservation as an alternative to the proposed reactors.  According to the court, NEPA required
agencies to investigate any colorable alternatives and energy conservation was such an
alternative, despite the intervenors’ failure to do much more than simply assert that conservation
could render the proposed reactors unnecessary.99  
The D.C. Circuit’s handling of these cases seems inordinately slow; even the court
acknowledged that its decision in Aeschliman was “long delayed.”100  The petition for review of
the grant of the Consumers Power construction permit was filed in 1973, and for review of the
fuel cycle rule and the award of Vermont Yankee’s operating license in 1974.  Yet the D.C.
Circuit did not issue its decisions until two years later, in July 1976.101  Vermont Yankee was
already operating, and therefore the impact on it of this delay was fairly minimal.  But for
Consumers Power, the wait meant a multi-year delay in commencing construction, which could
(and did) prove very costly to the Midland project.  Perhaps recognizing this impact, the court
102 See Aeschliman v. NRC, Docket Sheet, No. 73-1776 (noting petitioner’s first
emergency motion to enforce mandate filed on Oct. 6, 1977 and denied by the court on Oct. 27,
1977, and second motion filed on Mar. 20, 1978).
103 See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,707, 34,708
(1976).  The NRC subsequently resumed licensing shortly after it issued a revised Environmental
Survey and proposed interim fuel cycle rule.  See Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel
Cycle, 41 Fed. Reg. 49,898, 49,899 (1976).
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subsequently refused the intervenors’ request that it set aside the Consumers Power’s
construction permit, allowing construction of the Midland reactors to proceed.102  
The most significant effect of all, however, was the impact on nuclear licensing generally. 
The decisions called into question not only all licenses in which the now-vacated Table S-3
values were used to assess a reactor’s environmental impact, but in addition all licenses which
the AEC determined should not be reopened for application of Table S-3 and the fuel cycle rule. 
Moreover, until the rule was amended to address the D.C. Circuit’s concerns, no reactors could
be licensed without consideration of the fuel cycle’s environmental effects in the individual
license proceedings.  Hence, in response to the decision the NRC put all nuclear licensing on
hold until the Environmental Survey could be revised and an interim rule issued.103
III.  Vermont Yankee at the Supreme Court
The stage then shifted to the Supreme Court.  Both Vermont Yankee and Consumers
Power petitioned for writs of certiorari.  On the face of it, the odds of getting the Court to grant
cert would seem poor.  Not only was the exact nature of the D.C. Circuit’s holding on the fuel
cycle rulemaking ambiguous, but appellate reversal of two discrete and largely factbound agency
licensing proceedings, even if erroneous, rarely triggers further review.  Indeed, the ambiguities
of the D.C Circuit’s decision led to the novelty of the government submitting a “Janus-like” brief
104 See Vermont Yankee, 438 U.S. at 540 n.15.
105 See Brief for the Federal Respondents on Petition for Certiorari at 5-10, Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528, 76-548 and
76-745).  The Solicitor General’s willingness to go ahead and file such a brief stemmed in part
from the fact that the government needed to respond to the cert petitions filed by Vermont
Yankee and Consumers Power, but also may have reflected a desire to avoid debate over whether
agencies that have statutory authority to represent themselves in court can appear before the
Supreme Court without Solicitor General approval.  See Interview with Peter L. Strauss, General
Counsel to the NRC 1975-77, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Strauss
Interview].  For a discussion of issues raised by Solicitor General control over independent
agencies’ access to the Court, see generally Neal Devins, Unitariness, Independence, and
Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 215 (1994).
106 See Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 105, at 9; Brief for the Federal
Respondents at 37, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos.
76-419, 76-528).
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that simultaneously argued for and against a grant of certiorari.104  The NRC read the D.C.
Circuit as holding the rulemaking to be procedurally defective, albeit in compliance with § 553,
and argued that the question of a court’s authority to impose procedural requirements beyond
those contained in § 553 merited Supreme Court reversal.  The Solicitor General’s position, on
the other hand, was that the D.C. Circuit had simply held that the record in the fuel cycle
rulemaking was inadequate; an erroneous decision but not one that merited Supreme Court
review.105  The Solicitor General agreed, however, that the D.C. Circuit’s errors were more
significant if the decision were read as reversing the Commission on procedural grounds.106
The contrasting positions of the NRC and the Solicitor General on the need for Supreme
Court review merits note, because it underscores the different perspective of attorneys whose
responsibility is to represent the government generally in court and those who provide counsel to
specific agencies.  From the Solicitor General’s point of view, the ideal response to the D.C.
Circuit’s decision would be for the NRC on remand to supplement the record to provide
additional support for its conclusions, but not change its procedures.  If the appellate court again
107 See Strauss Interview, supra note 105.
108 See Uranium Fuel Cycle Impacts from Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive
Waste Management, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,803, 13,805-06 (1977); Transcript of Oral Argument 23,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528).
109See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 100, at 5-6, 13-18, 17-24, 34-36, 54; see
also Motion to Dismiss and Suggestion of Mootness, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Dec. 1, 1977) and responding briefs.
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reversed, the question of the propriety of judicial imposition of procedures in excess of § 553’s
requirements would then be cleanly presented, and the government would have an ideal test case
with which to take this issue to the Court.  The NRC and its lawyers, however, had no interest in
developing an ideal test case; their focus was instead on devising a response to the decision that
would allow licensing to resume as quickly as possible.  It was for this reason that the NRC
reopened the fuel cycle rule for further proceedings even while the petitions for certiorari were
pending.  But rather than risk a second reversal, the NRC wanted to fashion this supplemental
rulemaking to ensure that it would meet the D.C. Circuit’s procedural as well as substantive
concerns.107  Hence, although the agency adopted an interim rule using only § 553’s notice and
comment procedures, it planned to hold oral hearings on the final revised fuel cycle rule at which
participants could propose questions for the hearing board to ask.108
Of course, that the NRC intended to go forward with additional proceedings on the fuel
cycle rule was another factor making grant of certiorari unlikely.  But the Court seems not to
have focused on the fact that agency proceedings were ongoing at the certiorari stage.  As a
result, much of the discussion at oral argument focused on the status of the rulemaking and
Vermont Yankee’s license, and after argument there was supplemental briefing on whether the
case had become moot.109  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit decision clearly was having a significant
effect on nuclear licensing.  Previously, the Court had been willing to review appellate court
110 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
(reversing on the merits lower court determination that the Price-Anderson Act, capping plant
operators’ liability for nuclear accidents, was unconstitutional despite serious questions regarding
whether the citizen groups that brought the suit had standing).
111 Telephone Interview with Richard Ayres, Richard Ayres, principal of the Ayres Law
Group and co-founder NRDC (November 30, 2004); Roisman Interview, supra note 14.
112 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 540-41.  Justices Powell and Blackmun did not
participate.
113 Id. at 524, 542.
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decisions having a major impact on the nation’s nuclear program notwithstanding the presence of
similar factors counseling against a grant of certiorari.110  For this reason, neither Richard Ayres,
who argued the case at the Court on behalf of the NRDC, nor Anthony Roisman was surprised
that the Court decided to take the case.111
In any event, grant the Supreme Court did.  Acknowledging that “the matter is not
entirely free from doubt,” the Court read the D.C. Circuit as invalidating the fuel cycle rule
because of procedural deficiencies.  It then soundly reversed the D.C. Circuit in a unanimous
decision, written by then-Justice Rehnquist, in which seven justices participated.112  The Court
left open the possibility that judicial procedural impositions might be warranted in some
contexts, for example when needed to satisfy due process in quasi-adjudicatory proceedings or
when an agency departs without justification from “well-settled agency procedures of long
standing.”  However, “such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare,”113 and this was not
one of them.  Lest there be any doubt about its bottom line, the Court stated:  “[T]his much is
absolutely clear.  Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the
114 Id. at 543.
115 Id. at 523-24 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)).
116 Id. at 524, 545-46.
117 Id. at 546-47.
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administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.”114 
According to the Court, its prior decisions had rejected the view that the APA only set out
the procedural minima to which an agency must adhere, with courts free to amplify procedural
requirements due to the complexity or importance of the substantive issues involved.  On the
contrary, the Court read the APA as “generally speaking . . . establish[ing] the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose on agencies” in
rulemaking.  The procedural requirements of the APA were, in the Court’s view, “a formula
upon which opposing social and political forces ha[d] come to rest,” and not intended to evolve
over time through judicial innovation.115  Instead, under the APA, discretion to impose additional
procedures lay in the agencies, not in the courts.116  Judicial second-guessing of agency
procedural choices was not only precluded by the APA, but also unwise on policy grounds. 
Faced with unpredictable judicial procedural mandates and “Monday morning quarterbacking”
based on how well their chosen procedures actually functioned, agencies “would undoubtedly
adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance, . . . [and] the inherent advantages of
informal rulemaking would be totally lost.”117 
Strong words, but the Court saved its harshest language for its assessment of the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in the Consumers Power proceeding.  According to the Court, the appellate
118 Id. at 557-58.
119 Memorandum to All Circuit Judges and Judge Justice From Judge Fahy, Supreme
Court Decision in Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, at 1-2 (Apr. 5, 1978), (on file with the
Biddle Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Papers of Judge David L. Bazelon (Box
48, Folder 2)).
42
court’s decision reversing the grant of Consumers Power’s construction permit “borders on the
Kafkaesque”: 
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it may not.  But
Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy. . . . The fundamental
policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures
are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts.118
The Court could not have made plainer its view that the D. C. Circuit had overstepped its proper
role and illegitimately used its judicial review function to advance its judges’ own policy
preferences.  This harsh tone prompted a protest by senior D.C. Circuit Judge Fahy, who had sat
on the Aeschliman panel.  In a memo to the other circuit judges, which he also sent to Chief
Justice Burger, Judge Fahy remarked that while he expected reversal, he “was surprised . . . by
the severity” and “the unseemly character of the criticism heaped upon us”—criticism he argued
was unfair and rested on the Court’s failure to recognize that the D.C. Circuit had not stopped
construction of the Consumers Power reactors.119 
Given its unsparing condemnation of the D.C. Circuit, outright reversal would seem to
follow as a matter of course.  But instead the Court remanded to the D.C. Circuit for further
review.  Noting that “[t]here are also intimations in the majority opinion” suggesting that the
judges believed the administrative record was inadequate to support the fuel cycle rule, the Court
remanded to let the lower court rule expressly on the record’s adequacy.  Moreover, the Court
emphasized that it was taking no position on this question.  “Upon remand, the majority of the
120 435 U.S. at 535 n.14; see also id. at 549 (same).
121 See id. at 524-25, 542-45; Scalia, supra note 42, at 356-57, 359-75.
122 351 U.S. 192, 203-05 (1956); see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33, 39
(1964).  No doubt as a result of this clear precedent, none of the intervenors argued to the D.C.
Circuit or the Supreme Court that the NRC lacked authority to address the environmental effects
of the fuel cycle through generic rules and instead had to consider this issue on a case-by-case
basis in individual licensings.  See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 535 n.13.
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panel of the Court of Appeals is entirely free to agree or disagree with Judge Tamm’s conclusion
that the rule pertaining to the back end of the fuel cycle under which petitioner Vermont
Yankee’s license was considered is arbitrary and capricious” even if not procedurally faulty.120  In
other words, despite its stern language, the Court made clear that its decision might not affect the
result in the case, as the lower court was free to remand the fuel cycle rule to the agency provided
it did so on substantive rather than procedural grounds.
Judge Fahy was right to expect reversal once the Court granted review.  As the Court
itself and then-Professor Antonin Scalia argued, the D.C. Circuit’s willingness to impose
procedural requirements not based in statutes was, if not directly at odds, certainly in strong
tension with prior Supreme Court decisions.121   In particular, two lines of precedent presaged the
result in Vermont Yankee.  The first was the Court’s willingness to allow agencies to forego
formal adjudicatory or formal rulemaking procedures, even in contexts where it was originally
expected such procedures would be used.  Fairly early on in the life of the APA, in United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Company, the Court ruled that a statutory requirement of a full hearing
did not preclude an agency from using informal rulemaking to issue rules that significantly
limited the scope of adjudicatory hearings.122  In two decisions issued in the early 1970s, United
States v. Florida East Coast Railway Company and Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corporation, the
Court also took a narrow view of when agencies are required to use the APA’s formal
123 See Florida East Coast, 410 U.S. 224, 234-38; Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. 742, 757-
58 (1972).
124 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548; see also Siegel v. AEC,
400 F.2d 778, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding §2239(a) did not trigger formal rulemaking
requirements under the APA).  Section 2239(a) seems to authorize the fuel cycle rule awkwardly
at best, as the rule addresses the Commission’s activities in issuing licenses more than the
activities of licensees themselves.  The Commission also has general rulemaking authority under
42 U.S.C. § 2201(p), but judicial review in the Court of Appeals under the Hobbs Act, the
apparent basis for jurisdiction over the fuel cycle rule, is tied to orders made under § 2239. 
Although § 2239(b) similarly provides only for judicial review of any “order” entered in “any
proceeding” under § 2239(a), and under the APA orders are generated through adjudication
rather than rulemaking, by its text § 2239(a) includes some rulemaking proceedings.  See also
Nathaniel Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory
Misinterpretation, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 183, 189-95 (1978) (critiquing the Court for reading the
Atomic Energy Act as not requiring formal procedures for rulemaking undertaken under § 2239).
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rulemaking procedures, holding that a statutory provision authorizing an agency to issue rules
only “after hearing” was insufficient on its own to trigger formal rulemaking.123  As the Atomic
Energy Act included a similar hearing requirement, providing that the Commission must provide
a hearing if requested “[i]n any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and
regulations dealing with the activities of licensees,” Vermont Yankee’s unsubstantiated statement
that nothing in the NRC’s statutory mandate required additional procedures rests on the Florida
East Coast/Allegheny-Ludlum holdings.124  Vermont Yankee thus represents affirmation of
agencies’ power to use informal rulemaking in a broad array of contexts in lieu of the APA’s
more formal procedures.
The second line was the Court’s decisions upholding an agency’s discretion to control its
mode of procedure in the absence of statutory (or constitutional) mandates.  In SEC v. Chenery
Corporation, a decision issued shortly after the APA became effective, the Court held that the
choice to proceed by adjudication or rulemaking “is one that lies primarily in the informed
125 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
126 416 U.S. 267, 292-95 (1974).
127 410 U.S. at 242-45.
128 423 U.S. 326, 331-34 (1976) (per curiam); see also FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279,
290-91 (1965) (reasserting “the established principle that administrative agencies ‘should be free
to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting
them to discharge their multitudinous duties’”) (quoting FCC  v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143 (1940)); see also Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524-25, 543-45 (discussing FPC,
Schreiber, and Pottsville).
45
discretion of the administrative agency.”125  The Court reaffirmed this view that an agency must
have discretion to determine which procedures best serve its purposes just three years before the
Vermont Yankee decision, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company,126 as well as in Florida East
Coast Railway.127  The Court also expressed this insistence on agency procedural discretion in
decisions such as Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation,
where it faulted an appellate court for “dictating to the agency the methods, procedures, and time
dimensions” which would govern agency proceedings on remand.  Having found the agency’s
record inadequate to sustain its decision, the proper course was instead for the court “to remand
to the agency in order that it can exercise its administrative discretion in deciding how . . . it may
best proceed to develop the needed evidence.”128  Indeed, this was exactly the approach the Court
ultimately took in Vermont Yankee, when it left the D.C. Circuit free to hold that the fuel cycle
record as it currently stood was inadequate.
A third trend that sealed the D.C. Circuit’s fate was broader and more ideological.  Loss
of faith in apolitical agency expertise and concerns about agency capture affected the Supreme
Court as well as the D.C. Circuit in the 1960s and 1970s.  One manifestation was the Court’s
dramatic relaxing of standing and ripeness rules, another its willingness to engage in searching
129 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 42, at 377-81; Stewart, supra note 54, at 1814-15; Strauss,
supra note 70, at 1401-05, 1407-08; see also Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Common Law
and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 Utah. L. Rev. 3, 7-12 (1980) (arguing Supreme Court
has always taken a more common law approach to administrative law and the APA’s framers
expected it to do so).  But see Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1823, 1829 (1978) (arguing ripeness
and standing doctrines are distinguishable from other provisions of the APA).
130 See Merrill, supra note 73, at 1043-48, 1067-74; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 646-66 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 241, 244-56
(1992); see generally Strauss, supra note 70 (discussing changes in the Court’s approach to
interpreting the APA).
131 See John Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113,
139-46, 184-89 (1998) (noting change in statutory interpretation but arguing that Vermont
Yankee should be viewed as an instance of administrative common law).
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substantive scrutiny of agency decisions under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard. 
The effect of both developments was to foster far greater and earlier judicial review of agency
action than the APA’s drafters would have envisioned, thus calling into serious question the
assertion in Vermont Yankee that courts should adhere to the specific terms of the APA so as not
to deviate from the careful political compromise that the statute represented.129  But by the 1980s,
changes were afoot.  Public choice theory, with its skepticism about judicial impartiality and
conception of statutes as political compromises, buttressed growing opposition to judicial
policymaking on separation of powers grounds.  The result was a turn towards formalism and
textualism in statutory construction and away from more open-ended judicial development of
administrative law.130   Vermont Yankee is not a clear exemplar of this change; the decision was
issued in the late 1970s and invokes policy concerns to justify its conclusions.131  Nonetheless,
with its resistance to judicial inventiveness and its originalist approach to interpreting the APA,
Vermont Yankee signaled this coming trend in administrative law.
132 See Barbash, supra note 69, at A2.
133 See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to the Conference, Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Jan. 12, 1978) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box 201)).
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But while the Court’s rejection of judicial procedural impositions was to be expected, the
unanimity of the Vermont Yankee decision is surprising.  Joining the Court’s decision without
reservation were Justices Brennan and Marshall, hardly thought of as opponents of judicial
activism.  While the animosity between Chief Justice Burger and Judge Bazelon was well-
known, Justices Brennan and Marshall were good friends with Bazelon; indeed, Justice Brennan
was a regular at the Kronheim lunches.132  Their acquiescence in the Court’s harsh criticism of
the lower court is thus hard to explain.  Particularly given that the Court ended up remanding
rather than reversing the D.C. Circuit, and that NRC was committed to revising the fuel cycle
rule regardless of the Court’s decision, it seems odd that none of the Justices who participated in
the case challenged the Court’s decision to reach the merits.  
In fact, however, they did.  Justice Brennan led the charge, quickly drafting an opinion
that would dismiss the grant of certiorari as improvidently granted (or DIG, in the Court’s
parlance) once it became apparent after oral argument and supplemental briefing that the NRC
intended to go forward with a new rulemaking.133   Like the Court’s published opinion, Justice
Brennan’s draft stated that the Court of Appeals had erred “[i]f the Court of Appeals had decided
that NEPA requires procedures in rulemaking in excess of those expressly required by the
[APA]” and that the occasions for judicial imposition of hybrid rulemaking procedures are
“severely limited.”  However, Justice Brennan was far more generous in his reading of the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion, rejecting the procedural interpretation advocated by Vermont Yankee and the
134 See Brennan First Printed Draft at 8-9, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Feb. 17, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript
Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box 201)).  Justice Brennan even included a
footnote specifically defending Judge Bazelon against the charge that he had sanctioned
imposition of additional procedures in his separate opinion below.  See id. at 9 n.15.
135 See Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Brennan, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Jan. 17, 1978) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box
201)).
136 See Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Brennan, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Feb. 10, 1978) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box
201)). 
48
NRC:  “Instead, we understand the Court of Appeals to have held only that the original spent fuel
rule was inadequately supported by the rulemaking record.”  And review of this determination—
unlikely to warrant Supreme Court consideration in any event—was particularly inappropriate
given that the NRC was committed to revising the rule.134  
Justice Brennan’s efforts proved unavailing.  In a responding memorandum, Justice
Rehnquist made clear he would dissent from any effort to dismiss the grant of certiorari, stressing
the continuing impact of the D.C. Circuit’s decision on the licenses of the two plants involved
and reactor licensing generally.135  His views carried the day, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White and Justice Stevens also voting against dismissal.136  Justice Brennan then turned his
attentions to trying to temper Justice Rehnquist’s proposed draft.  He again urged that the better
course was to read the D.C. Circuit decision as simply holding the fuel cycle rule was
inadequately supported by the record, with an aside to the effect that judicial imposition of
procedures would be plainly improper here.  And he also argued against remanding, stating
“[w]hether or not a remand [for further consideration] could be said to ‘border[] on the
137 See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Rehnquist Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Feb. 27, 1978) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box 201)). 
Justice Marshall also suggested a few modifications “to soften some of the language just a bit,”
which Justice Rehnquist took.  Justice Marshall’s suggestions were minor language tweakings
that left more room for the possibility that additional procedures might be judicially required. 
Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Rehnquist, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Mar. 3, 1978) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box 201)).  
138 See Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Brennan, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Feb. 27, 1978) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box
201)) (“I do not think it can be fairly said that the Court of Appeals did not review the procedures
employed by the agency and remand because it considered the procedures inadequate.”).
139 See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Rehnquist, Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Feb. 28, 1978) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box
201)); Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Brennan, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419, 76-528) (Mar. 20, 1976 [sic]) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Room, Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Box 201)).
140 For academic commentary, see articles cited in supra notes 42, 54, 124, 12 & infra
note 141.  For discussion of the briefing in Vermont Yankee, see Strauss, supra note 70, at
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Kafkaesque,’ I do think it simply wastes everyone’s time.”137  But here too, Justice Brennan’s
renowned powers of persuasion fell short, with Justice Rehnquist refusing to accept a non-
proceduralist reading of the lower court’s decision.138  Although at first threatening to write
separately, Justice Brennan ultimately signed onto Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in full, remarking
to Justice Rehnquist “you are a damned good fisherman.  Indeed, so good that I now give up the
sporting fight and ‘acquiesce’ in your catch in these cases.”139
IV. The Impact of Vermont Yankee
Vermont Yankee sparked extensive commentary when it was issued, as well as extensive
briefing when it was before the Court.140  Its unqualified and stern language reinforces the
1408-11.
141 See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for
Vermont Yankee III, 55 Tul. L. Rev. 418, 418-19 (1981); see also Byse, supra note 129, at 1826-
30 (1978) (supporting decision in Vermont Yankee but arguing that courts retain power to
adequately oversee agency procedures through substantive review); Davis, supra note 129, at 16
(criticizing the Vermont Yankee decision but arguing that the Court’s retention of substantive
scrutiny may limit its impact); William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee:
Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 Geo. L.J. 699, 713-15 (1979) (arguing Vermont
Yankee unlikely to effect hard look review, but will discourage agencies’ procedural
innovations).
142 See Strauss, supra note 70, at 1412 & n.68.
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impression that it is an administrative law decision of major import, and the opinion is a leading
case in every administrative law casebook.  But how significant was Vermont Yankee really, in
the end?
One reason to question its importance is evident on the face of the decision itself, in the
fact that the Court remanded for the D.C. Circuit to determine whether the fuel cycle rule was
adequately supported by the record.  As several commentators remarked, if the Court meant to
leave substantive judicial review unaffected and only curb judicial imposition of procedural
requirements, then the decision’s actual import would be far more limited than might at first
appear.141   Judge Leventhal would be crowned the victor in his battle with Judge
Bazelon—which was indeed how the former viewed the decision142—but in practice little would
change.  Courts would remain active in policing and overseeing informal rulemaking.
Over time, it has become apparent that the Court did intend to draw such a distinction
between procedure and substance in judicial review.  To be sure, the Court at times has taken a
highly deferential stance in scrutinizing an agency’s substantive conclusions—a prime example
being the decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Company v. NRDC, when the fuel cycle rule
made its next (and final) appearance before the Court.   On remand from Vermont Yankee, the
143 See NRDC v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 478-85 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
144 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103-04 (1983).  It is worth noting
that Justice Brennan again tried to mitigate criticism of Judge Bazelon and the D.C. Circuit,
prompting Justice Blackmun to write in his personal notes on the case that Brennan “is protecting
his friend, and with difficulty.”  See Conference Sheet, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462
U.S. 87 (1983) (Nos. 82-524, 82-545, 82-551) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript
Room, Papers of Justice Harry Blackmun (Box 386)). 
145 See 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
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D.C. Circuit first stayed the proceeding to allow the NRC to issue its revised fuel cycle rule and
then, in a lengthy decision, held the new rule was inadequately supported by the record.  In the
D.C. Circuit’s view, the NRC’s continuing refusal to take the uncertainties involved in long-term
storage and disposal of nuclear waste into account in balancing the costs and benefits of nuclear
reactors violated NEPA and was arbitrary and capricious.143  Once more, however, the Court
disagreed.  In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, it held that where, as here, an agency is
“making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science[,] . . . . a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”144  Particularly important for the Court
was the NRC’s openness regarding the uncertainties that underlay its approach (an openness that
contrasted with the AEC’s earlier uncritical acceptance of Dr. Pittman’s testimony).
But notwithstanding such deference to agency decisionmaking under conditions of
uncertainty, the Court has continued to adhere to Overton Park’s emphasis on judicial
responsibility to engage in close scrutiny of agency decisionmaking.  In Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, a decision issued
less than three weeks after Baltimore Gas, the Court described the judicial task as being to ensure
that agencies “examine the relevant data[,] articulate a satisfactory explanation for [their]
actions,” consider “the relevant factors” and not ignore “an important aspect of the problem.”145 
146 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
147 See Stewart, supra note 54, at 1816.
148 496 U.S. 633, 654-55 (1990).
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The APA supports requiring agencies to compile administrative records adequate to explain their
decisions, authorizing courts to “set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . .
. arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”146  However, the level of agency explanation
and factual basis that courts often require goes beyond that mandated the mild language of this
provision.  Thus, such rigorous substantive scrutiny would seem to contradict the holding of
Vermont Yankee.147  
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corporation, the Court attempted to diffuse
this charge of inconsistency.  According to the Court, its decisions upholding searching
substantive review at most impose a “general procedural requirement of sorts . . . that an agency
take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the court to evaluate the
agency’s rationale.”  By contrast, “Vermont Yankee stands for the general proposition that courts
are not free to impose upon agencies specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the
APA.”148  In practice, however, this distinction between general and specific procedural mandates
may offer little comfort to agencies.  Whether a court phrases its complaint in terms of the
general inadequacy of the record or specific procedural deficiencies, the net result is a remand. 
Moreover, on Vermont Yankee’s own reasoning, the rational administrative response to searching
substantive review is to act preemptively by developing an exhaustive record, responding to
every possible later judicial objection, which imposes delay and limits the flexibility of informal
rulemaking in the same way as does judicial procedural scrutiny.
149 See, e.g., Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1986); see generally
1 Administrative Law Treatise, supra note 88, § 7.3 at 430-41.
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Equally important, Vermont Yankee has not called into question lower court decisions
adopting expansive accounts of the terse and minimal requirements of § 553.  As noted, this
practice is evident in several decisions issued prior to Vermont Yankee, such as Kennecott
Copper and Portland Cement, and it continued unabated after the Vermont Yankee decision came
down.  For example, courts have held that agencies violate § 553’s minimal demand that an
agency provide notice of “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved” if the rule ultimately adopted is not adequately foreshadowed
by the agencies’ original proposal.  They have also read § 553 as requiring that the agency
provide notice of the data and studies on which the proposed rule is based.149  Neither the Court
nor the participants in Vermont Yankee ever called into question these decisions adopting
expansive readings of § 553’s requirements, and the Court has not seen fit to do so since.  
It is interesting to puzzle over why these decisions interpreting § 553 were unaffected by
Vermont Yankee, despite their seeming tension.  The answer that these paper hearing
requirements are rooted in the text of the APA is implausible; like searching substantive scrutiny,
these requirements go far beyond the minimal language of the APA and its framers’ original
understandings.  Instead, the explanation may lie in the disconnect between Vermont Yankee’s
dictate and contemporary administrative reality.  Allowing agencies to provide only vague and
general information on their proposed actions became untenable in light of the expansion and
import of informal rulemaking, as well as changing norms regarding openness in government
incorporated in the Freedom of Information Act and other statutes.  The need to preserve
mechanisms for ensuring agency accountability led courts to read Vermont Yankee in the
150 See Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law 510-15, 549 (10th
rev. ed., 2003); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 95, 111 (2003).
151 See Strauss, supra note 70, at 1410-11; see also Stewart, supra note 54, at 1812-14
(expressing concern that Vermont Yankee jeopardized decisions developing idea of paper
hearing).
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narrowest of terms, as disavowing ad hoc procedural review of the kind advocated by Judge
Bazelon but not challenging the fundamental image of courts and agencies as partners in the
quest for reasoned decisionmaking.  Moreover, it is not surprising that courts would continue to
rely on procedural requirements in particular as a means of reining in agencies, giving their
familiarity and comfort with adjudicatory process.150 
Vermont Yankee thus had fairly minimal effect on the courts’ transformation of informal
rulemaking procedures and the development of paper hearing requirements.151  Yet it is also
important not to ignore the impact that the decision did have.  Notwithstanding the creative
judicial interpretations of § 553’s text, Vermont Yankee limited judges’ ability to constrain
agencies through procedural means.  Further, the Court’s remand for the D.C. Circuit to
determine the adequacy of the fuel cycle rulemaking record conveyed its evident sanction of
substantive review of agency decisionmaking.  The net result was to give a green light to the hard
look doctrine and close judicial scrutiny of rulemaking records, an approach the Supreme Court
even more expressly sanctioned in State Farm.   Much administrative law scholarship has since
condemned such searching substantive review as creating major problems for informal
rulemaking.  According to these critics, courts lack the scientific and technical knowledge to
distinguish the wheat from the chaff, and have held up or reversed major rulemaking efforts
because of minor errors.  Moreover agencies, fearing reversal, have felt obliged to respond in
152 For a classic accounts of this argument, see Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The
Struggle for Auto Safety (1990); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1387-96, 1410-26 (1992).  Others take a more positive
view of the hard look doctrine.   See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking,
75 Tex.  L.  Rev. 483, 503-524 (1997); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of
Cholera,  49 Admin. L.  Rev. 659, 662-63 (1997); see also Strauss et al., supra note 150, at
1017-26 (providing additional samplings of the debate).
153 For arguments regarding the limited benefits from greater adversarial procedures in
rulemakings that address complex scientific issues, see Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and
Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 749-53, 776-80 (1979); Yellin, supra note 3,
at 505-08, 552-53.
55
detail to minor issues, transforming rulemakings into lengthy, resource-intensive proceedings and
destroying their promise as a means of efficient and coherent regulation.152  
Of course, these criticisms of the hard look doctrine may be misguided, and in any event
judicial procedural review might well have had a similar effect.  Certainly, the benefits of greater
adversarial procedures are easy to exaggerate.153  But it is worth noting that despite the D.C.
Circuit’s greater affection for cross-examination and other adversarial mechanisms, not even that
court advocated employing full-scale adjudicatory proceedings such as are laid out in the APA’s
requirements for formal rulemaking.  The Court’s predictions in Vermont Yankee of dire effects
from Monday-morning procedural quarterbacking may therefore have been somewhat
overblown.  True, the possibility of reversal on procedural grounds might well lead agency
counsel to advise widespread use of procedures, such as oral hearings or perhaps some
opportunity for questioning, that clearly go beyond what § 553 requires and could seriously
hamper rulemaking.  But it is also possible that, over time, courts and agencies might have come
to general agreement on when additional procedures are needed and what form those procedures
154 The evolution of procedural due process may be instructive here.  In the procedural
due process context, the Court has insisted on independently assessing the constitutional
adequacy of procedures once it determines that a protected property interest is at stake.  See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539–41 (1985).  Yet over time, the Court in
practice has become increasingly deferential to governmental procedural choices, even when the
only procedure supplied by the government is a post-deprivation judicial remedy.  See, e.g.,
Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Ltd., 532 U.S. 189, 195-99 (2001); Walters v. National Ass’n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321-34 (1985).
155 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
156 See Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of
Bureaucracy 228 (1990).
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should take.154  Indeed, one clear message of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Vermont Yankee is
that agency acceptance of conclusory and unsubstantiated statements is likely to provoke courts
to think greater procedural protections were necessary.  Notably, in its opinion the D.C. Circuit
stated that “the procedures the agency adopted in this case, if administered in a more sensitive,
deliberate manner, might suffice.”155  Thus, had the hearing board subjected Dr. Pittman to more
probing questions or the AEC been more acknowledging of the weaknesses of his testimony,
perhaps the D.C. Circuit would have ruled differently.
Another effect of Vermont Yankee is that it precluded courts from engaging agencies in a
more honest dialogue regarding the flaws courts perceive in agency decisionmaking and the
benefits of different procedures.  A court that believes an agency should have employed
additional procedures now can only express its objections in substantive terms, perhaps leading
the agency to misunderstand the real basis of the court’s concerns.156  In addition, rather than
justify their procedural impositions (such as detailed notice requirements) on straightforward
policy grounds, courts must now root these mandates in the terms of § 553, making it harder for
agencies and others to refute the appropriateness of these measures.  In this light, the main effect
of Vermont Yankee was not to preclude courts from imposing procedural controls on agencies,
157 See Matthew L. Wald, Safety of Adding to Nuclear Plants’ Capacity Is Questioned,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2004, at A15; David Gram, Nuclear Waste: Meltdown of Vermont
Harmony, L.A. Times, May 24, 1987, at 26.  For stories of occasional problems at Vermont
Yankee, see Nuclear Plant Faces NRC Fine in Vermont, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1996, at B8; Fine
Proposed for Errors at Yankee Nuclear Plant, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1982, at A6.
158 Roisman Interview, supra note 14.
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but to force courts to do so sub rosa, with openness and rationality of judicial decisionmaking
suffering in the process. 
As for Vermont Yankee’s impact on nuclear power, both Vermont Yankee and
Consumers Powers received their licenses.  Other than occasional safety shutdowns, Vermont
Yankee has been operating since 1972.  However, Vermont Yankee faces a growing problem of
what to do with its spent nuclear fuel, given the lack of any fuel reprocessing or long-term
disposal facilities in the country.  Vermont Yankee stores its spent fuel on-site, but space in its
spent-fuel pool is now at a premium, and the plant was already given permission to re-rack the
pool to higher density in 1997—absent that permission, it would have had to shut down.  Sold to
Entergy Nuclear Corporation in 2002, Vermont Yankee is also in the midst of a new licensing
battle at the NRC as it seeks permission to expand its energy generating capacity.157  The state of
Vermont has intervened, choosing none other than Anthony Roisman to assist it in the
proceedings.158 
Consumers Powers was not so lucky.  Its Midland Plant was plagued with construction
problems, including the need to add a new foundation when the plant began to sink.  These
problems, combined with lengthy regulatory proceedings and Consumers Power’s lack of capital,
led to substantial delays in the plant’s construction.  Dow Chemical eventually pulled out of the
project in 1983, when the plant was nearly ten years late and still unfinished.   Consumers
159 See John R. Emshwiller, Nuclear Fallout: Utility Plant Delays in Michigan Spur Rift
with Major Customer, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1977, at 1; Ron Winslow, Chain of Problems at
Nuclear Site Threatens Consumers Power’s Plan to Finish Facility, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1983, at
33; Michigan Utility Says It Will Close Midland Project, Wall St. J., July 17, 1984, at 1; Thomas
W. Lippman, Rescue of a Failed Nuclear Plant; Mothballed for Years, Michigan Facility
Operates on Natural Gas, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1990, at D1.
160 See 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter 581, 582-83
(1977); see also Frank  N. von Hippel, Plutonium and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel,
Science, Sept. 28, 2001, at 2397 (describing changes in approach to reprocessing in subsequent
administrations).
161 See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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ultimately stopped work on the plant one year later, with only one reactor near completion and
the company already having spent $4.2 billion—over a ten-fold increase from the original
estimated cost of $359 million for two reactors.  In the end, the plant was reconfigured and came
on-line in 1987 as a cogeneration facility that burns natural gas to produce steam for Dow as well
as electricity.  This allowed Consumers Powers to avoid bankruptcy, although Michigan
ratepayers bore substantial costs as a result of the failed nuclear power effort.159
Most importantly, the problem of what to do about nuclear waste has continued to plague
the nuclear power industry.  Concerns about expanding access to plutonium led President Carter
to impose a moratorium on licensing any fuel reprocessing plants in 1977.160  While this removed
the difficult issues of nuclear proliferation and how to secure plutonium produced by
reprocessing from the nuclear waste debate, it heightened the need to develop a long-term storage
facility.  Spent nuclear fuel has continued to pile up in temporary storage pools at nuclear
facilities across the country, with the total amount of such fuel being estimated at 49,000 metric
tons in 2003.161  But developing a long-term storage facility, and more specifically determining
where to locate it, has been a major political minefield.  Recognition of the growing nuclear
waste problem led to enactment the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), which set up a
162  Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10101-
10270). 
163 For criticism of NWPA and its subsequent amendments, see Gregory Jacob, Site
Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste Repository 95-163 (1990).
164 See Nuclear Energy Inst., 373 F.3d at 1258-62, 1273.
165 See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Settles Nuclear Case over Burial of Waste, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 2004, at A5; Matthew L. Wald, Ruling on Nuclear Site Leaves Next Move to Congress,
N.Y. Times, July 14, 2004, at A20.  On September 1st, 2004, the D.C. denied rehearing and
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detailed system for identification and approval of a site for a long-term disposal facility.162 
Ongoing political and legal battles over selecting a depository site proved expensive and time-
consuming, and in 1987 Congress directed the federal agencies involved to focus their efforts on
developing a facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, located on the federal government’s Nevada
Test Site.163  Not surprisingly, the selection of Yucca Mountain was vigorously opposed by
Nevada, as well as other states along the train routes on which nuclear waste would be
transported.  Over the ensuing years, Nevada (along with several environmental groups) brought
numerous legal challenges, and in July 2004 one of these challenges proved successful before the
D.C. Circuit.  That court, again entering the nuclear waste fray, held that the EPA’s use of a
10,000 year time period as the standard for assessing the facility’s environmental impact was not
a reasonable interpretation of the 1992 Energy Policy Act.164  
Even prior to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, Yucca Mountain was not expected to be
operating before 2010 at the earliest, and the continuing delay in opening a waste depository
means that the federal government owes nuclear plant operators millions, and potentially billions,
to cover the costs for storing waste.  While Congress could overturn the D.C. Circuit’s decision,
quick legislative action to get Yucca Mountain back on track seems unlikely, and the success of
efforts to issue acceptable regulations is uncertain.165  But what is clear is that, nearly 30 years
rehearing en banc, and the period for seeking certiorari at the Supreme Court expired without a
petition being filed.
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after the decision in Vermont Yankee, the courts are still making their voices heard on questions
of nuclear waste disposal and nuclear policy.
